many
with Asperger's Syndrome, a high-functioning form
of autism, who may not have been diagnosed or received
services when younger.
The
plaintiff in the case, T.H., is a fifty-four year
old man with Asperger’s Syndrome, who lived
with his parents all his life. T.H.’s parents
provided for all of his care, and had never applied
for state services. After the parents’ death,
however, T.H.’s sister applied for DDD eligibility
when it became clear that she could not continue his
care at home.
State
law governing DDD eligibility requires the presence
of a developmental disability prior to age twenty-two,
which results in functional limitations in at least
three of six life skills areas. Until now, DDD’s
administrative rules added an additional burden requiring
that an individual’s functional limitations
be documented before age twenty-two. That difference
is the crux of the case, since DDD rejected the evidence
offered by the family, without regard to their credibility,
but on grounds that their evidence was “anecdotal”
and not “documentary.”
T.H.’s
sister, who testified in the case, described her brother's
lifelong rigidity, reclusive behavior, obsessive preoccupations,
and social isolation. She recounted how he would not
attend family gatherings or social functions, going
so far as to miss work on days that social events
were scheduled. She described his inability to make
eye contact during conversation and his constant monologues
on matters of little or no interest to his listener.
Her brothers obsessions manifest themselves in everything
from his inability to converse about anything other
that advanced astronomy, and more recently, the Jehovah’s
Witness belief that the end of the world was coming,
to his inability to eat anything but the exact same
meal each night. He would become extremely agitated
if any aspect of that meal was changed, including
the presence of ice in his drink.
T.H.
held a job in
the family business that
was developed for him by his father. When the business
was sold, T.H.’s employment was continued as
a condition of the sale of the business to outsiders.
While he could carry out the meticulous and repetitive
tasks of an expediter for which he was paid, he has
no understanding of the value of money or of how to
handle personal finances. He could not prepare a meal,
shop for food, or keep house, and refused to attend
to personal hygiene unless prodded.
The
state did not contest T.H.’s diagnosis of Asperger's
Syndrome, and confirmed that his functional limitations
were sufficient to warrant DDD eligibility, resting
its denial instead on a defense of its restrictive
regulatory language and its interpretation of New
Jersey’s Developmental Disability Rights Act.
The
decision, written by Justice Virginia Long, stated
“we can think of no more relevant and probative
evidence than testimony of relatives who lived with
T.H and his problems – year in and year out
– over a lifetime. To rule otherwise would be
to be to punish families that chose to care for their
disabled children in lieu of placing them in a facility.”
"Like
many adults with Asperger's Syndrome, T.H. at first
appears extremely bright," said Prior. "However,
he clearly has a serious disability and cannot live
independently without support services. No one knows
that better than the family,” he added, “and
the fact that they didn’t apply for services
previously shouldn't have a bearing on a contemporary
eligibility decision and the state’s responsibilities
under the law.”
Hinkle,
Fingles & Prior, a disability law firm with offices
in New Jersey and Pennsylvania has brought more than
a dozen cases on behalf of people with disabilities
before the State Supreme Court.
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